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1 Introduction
Despite their recent decrease, the still high unemployment rates in most European
countries are a problem of deep concern for these economies. In addition, a particularly
noticeable feature of the high unemployment rates in Europe would be given by its rel-
atively greater concentration among low-skilled workers. This is illustrated in Table
1, which shows the total unemployment rates, together with their distribution accord-
ing to the attained level of education, for the OECD countries in 1998. Notice that
the data on educational levels refer to people aged 25-64 years, unlike unemployment
rates that refer to people aged 15-64 years. This fact explains why in some countries
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey) the total unemployment rate is greater
than in any of the educational levels considered, and the diﬀerence would be explained
by unemployment among young people (i. e., people aged 15-24 years).
The main message from Table 1 would be that, for all the countries in the table
(with the exceptions of Greece, Portugal, and Turkey) unemployment rates are higher
in the lowest educational levels. In particular, this is the case of Spain, where the
highest unemployment rate is that of the lowest educated workers; and the even higher
total unemployment rate is due to the importance of youth unemployment, presumably
less educated.
This situation has led to a debate in policy circles on the role of social security con-
tributions, since these taxes might be considered as a disincentive for labour demand;
see OECD (1995) for a broad overview of the issue. In particular, some authors have
proposed to reduce or even eliminate social security contributions falling on low wage
earners, as a way to ﬁght against unemployment among low-skilled workers; see, e. g.,
Dre`ze and Malinvaud (1994) or Alogoskouﬁs et al. (1995).
The justiﬁcation of such a proposal would be the following (Nickell and Bell, 1997).
In principle, if wages are ﬂexible, there should be no relation between the level of social
security contributions and the level of unemployment since, in the long run, non-wage
costs would be borne by the employees. But it can be presumed that wages at the
bottom end of the pay distribution are not ﬂexible because of the wage ﬂoor generated
by minimum wage laws, unions, the beneﬁt system, and so on. In this way, reducing
social security contributions for low wage earners (basically, the unskilled) may have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on employment in the long run, since payroll taxes would not be borne
by labour for this type of workers. However, as noticed by Nickell and Bell (1997), a
potential disadvantage of this policy would be that it may reduce the incentive for the
unskilled to acquire training.
In this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of such a proposal for the case of
Spain, a medium-size economy whose labour market is characterized by a substantial
unemployment rate, higher than the European average, and with a very high compo-
nent of unskilled unemployment. We will analyze this issue by means of a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model, simulated for the Spanish economy. Since these
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models trace the consequences of changes in a particular variable throughout the en-
tire economy modelled, this general equilibrium framework provides a more complete
analysis than partial equilibrium models (Scarf and Shoven, 1984).
On the other hand, the empirical implementation through CGE models of the kind
of policy measures analyzed in this paper, has been hardly made. An exception is
Sørensen (1997), who analyzes the eﬀects of shifting the tax burden away from low-
skilled labour and away from the production of consumer services in a CGE model
simulated for the Danish economy. However, the possibility of imperfect competition
in the output market is not contemplated in the model, an important feature that we
address in this paper (see below). Also, our model incorporates a higher sectoral and
household disaggregation; and we take more realistic values, diﬀerent among sectors,
for the Armington elasticities of substitution, as compared to the extremely low values,
equal for all sectors, used by Sørensen.
The model in this paper embodies three relevant features. First, in addition to
the more common assumption in the literature of perfectly competitive ﬁrms under
constant returns to scale, our model is also able to incorporate increasing returns to
scale and a non-competitive price rule. The availability of recent, high-quality data
for all (i. e., manufacturing and non-manufacturing) sectors of the Spanish economy
allows us to incorporate sectoral concentration measures in the non-competitive version
of the model.
Second, neutrality of tax reforms on public revenue is a key issue both for the
analysis of welfare eﬀects, and for the evaluation of their feedback eﬀects on other
variables. If social contribution rates are lowered, other taxes (usually the value-added
tax) should be increased, leading to a restrictive eﬀect that partial equilibrium models
do not reﬂect. Also, in recent years, governments are increasingly concerned with the
fact that ﬁscal reforms should not aﬀect the public sector deﬁcit. We modify the typical
neutrality assumption to incorporate this additional constraint.
Third, we analyze the eﬀects of two diﬀerent ﬁscal reforms, namely, a cut in social
contribution rates, for all types of labour, and only for unskilled labour. To this end, we
provide a disaggregation of households that allows us to evaluate the diﬀerent eﬀects
according to the skill level of each household. The labour market is modelled following
a matching unemployment rule.
Therefore, in this paper we will use a CGE model in order to analyze the eﬀects
of a ﬁscal policy reform aimed to employment creation by decreasing social security
contributions, and how diﬀerent scenarios might inﬂuence the results, both at the
aggregate and sectoral levels. The setup of the model is presented in section 2, the
empirical analysis and results are discussed in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
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2 The model
The model of this paper is static, and describes a single open economy disaggregated
in eleven production sectors, with eleven consumption goods, twelve households, and
a public sector. The model is a derivation of Go´mez (1999).
As a general rule, the notation is as follows: endogenous variables are denoted by
capital letters, exogenous variables by capital letters with a bar, and parameters by
small Latin and Greek letters. There are n (i, j = 1, . . . , n) production sectors. The
goods produced by these n sectors are transformed intom (k = 1, . . . , m) consumption
goods, of which good m is public ﬁnal consumption, and good m− 1 is the residents’
consumption abroad. There are r (h = 1, . . . , r) private households.
To solve the model, we use Rutherford’s (1999) method, based on Mathiesen (1985),
who proposes solving general equilibrium models as mixed complementarity problems.
Hence, there are two types of equations in the CGE model: those representing that
ﬁrms just break even, and those representing goods and factor market clearing. All of
them are numbered below, with some additional equations referring to constraints to
the system.
2.1 Production
Domestic producers are subject to a technology characterised by a three-level nest-
ing and constant returns to scale. So, for each sector i, the ﬁrst nesting level is a
Leontief production function where output Xi comes from a composite of primary in-
puts V Ai, and n composites of intermediate inputs II1i, . . . , IIni. The second nesting
level refers to the composite of primary inputs V Ai, which is a CES function of labour
Li, and capital Ki. And the third nesting level is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labour
inputs Li, made of skilled labour L
s
i , and unskilled labour L
us
i .
To obtain the zero-proﬁt equations, we have estimated the corresponding cost func-
tions, which come from:
min PXiXi = PV AiV Ai +
n∑
j=1
POjIIji
s. t. Xi = min
(
V Ai
c0i
,
II1i
c1i
, . . . ,
IIni
cni
)
where PXi is the unit price of output; PV Ai and POji are the prices of composites
V Ai and IIji, respectively; and c0i, c1i,. . . , cni are Leontief coeﬃcients
1.
The cost functions for the second nesting level come from the next problem:
min PV AiV Ai = PLiLi +R Ki
1The assumption of ﬁxed coeﬃcients is frequently used in CGE models (see Dixon et al. (1992),
pp. 211-219). This can be justiﬁed since many empirical studies do not ﬁnd an eﬀect of changes in
the relative prices of inputs on changes in their relative quantities.
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s. t. V Ai = αi

aiL
σLK
i
−1
σLK
i
i + (1− ai)K
σLK
i
−1
σLK
i
i


σLK
i
σLK
i
−1
where PLi is the average labour cost, R is the capital rent, αi is a scale parameter,
ai is a share parameter, and σ
LK
i is the elasticity of substitution between labour and
capital.
Finally, the third nesting level involves the next problem:
min PLiLi = W
s(1 + soccei + soccwi)L
s
i +W
us(1 + soccei + soccwi)L
us
i
s. t. Li = βi

bi(Lsi )
σLLi −1
σLL
i + (1− bi)(Lusi )
σLLi −1
σLL
i

 σ
LL
i
σLL
i
−1
where W s and W us are the reservation wages for skilled and unskilled labour, respec-
tively; soccei and soccwi are the eﬀective tax rates of social contributions paid by
employers and employees, respectively; βi is a scale parameter; bi is a share parameter;
and σLLi is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour.
The solution of the three above optimization problems gives us the cost functions,
which are used to get the zero-proﬁt conditions2. From the ﬁrst problem we have:
ΠXi = PXi − c0iPV Ai −
n∑
j=1
cjiPOj = 0 (1)
for the second problem:
ΠLKi = PV Ai −
1
αi
(
a
σLKi
i PL
1−σLKi
i + (1− ai)σ
LK
i R1−σ
LK
i
) 1
1−σLK
i = 0 (2)
and for the third problem:
(3)Π
L
i = PLi −
1
βi
(
W s(1 + soccei + soccwi)
bi
)bi(W us(1 + soccei + soccwi)
1− bi
)1−bi
= 0
where ΠXi , Π
LK
i , and Π
L
i are unit proﬁts at the ﬁrst, second, and third nesting level,
respectively.
The next step is to estimate the market clearing conditions. Derived demand
functions are obtained using Shepard’s lemma on cost functions, which is equivalent to
apply Shepard’s lemma to the above zero-proﬁt conditions with negative sign. Hence,
the market clearing conditions apply when3:
2In all the optimization problems we use Green’s (1964) theorem on price and quantity homogenous
indices. Note the duality between production functions (quantity indices) and cost functions (price
indices).
3As a general rule, in market clearing equations we present supply in the left-hand side, and
demand in the right-hand side.
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V Ai = Xi
(
− ∂Π
X
i
∂PV Ai
)
(4)
IIji = Xi
(
− ∂Π
X
i
∂POj
)
(5)
The equilibrium conditions in factor markets are shown in section 2.6.
The estimated production is Xi, which corresponds to eﬀective production. How-
ever, data availability (see section 3.1) obliges us to convert eﬀective production into
distributed production using a ﬁxed coeﬃcients matrix, as in Ballard et al. (1985, pp.
76-77):


q11 q12 . . . q1n
q21 q22 . . . q2n
...
...
. . .
...
qn1 qn2 . . . qnn

 ×


X1
X2
...
Xn

 =


DIST1
DIST2
...
DISTn

 (6)
where Xi is eﬀective production, DISTi is distributed production, and qij are ﬁxed
coeﬃcients. Distributed production is then used to get the total supply of goods in
the economy, which is composed of domestic production and imports; and these goods
have two possible destinations: domestic and foreign markets. Next, we are going to
introduce zero-proﬁt conditions for this supply.
Total supply is modelled by means of the following CES Armington4 aggregate Ai,
from domestic output and imports, for each sector i:
Ai =

eiDIST
σA
i
−1
σA
i
i + (1− ei)IMP
σA
i
−1
σA
i
i


σA
i
σA
i
−1
where Ai is the total amount of goods supplied, composed by distributed production
DISTi, and imports IMPi; ei is a share parameter; and σ
A
i is the Armington elasticity
of substitution.
This aggregate shows that producers choose the optimal mix between domestic
goods and imports. Hence, producers minimize their costs, subject to the technological
restriction assumed in the Armington aggregate, that is:
min PAiAi = PDISTi(1 + npti)(1 + vatdisti)DISTi
+ PFXFC(1 + iti)(1 + vatimpi)IMPi
s. t. Ai =

eiDIST
σA
i
−1
σA
i
i + (1− ei)IMP
σA
i
−1
σA
i
i


σA
i
σA
i
−1
4In essence, Armington’s (1969) assumption amounts to assume that goods with diﬀerent geo-
graphical origins are taken as close but not perfect substitutes.
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where PAi is the unit price of the supplied good; PDISTi is the unit price of dis-
tributed production; PFXFC are world prices multiplied by a conversion factor to
local currency; and npti, iti, vatdisti, and vatimpi are eﬀective tax rates denoting,
respectively, net production taxes, import tariﬀs, value-added tax on distributed pro-
duction, and value-added tax on imports.
The cost function is obtained by solving the optimization problem in the usual way,
so that the zero-proﬁt condition can be written as:
(7)
ΠAi = PAi −
(
e
σAi
i (PDISTi(1 + npti)(1 + vatdisti))
1−σAi
+ (1− ei)σAi (PFXFC(1 + iti)(1 + vatimpi))1−σAi
) 1
1−σA
i
= 0
where ΠAi are unit proﬁts. Market-clearing equations are:
DISTi = Ai
(
− ∂Π
A
i
∂PDISTi
)
(8)
IMPi = Ai
(
− ∂Π
A
i
∂FC
)
(9)
The next set of equations refers to the producers’ decision on the market of des-
tination for their goods. As suppliers, producers maximize their revenue subject to
a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, nested in two levels5: at the
ﬁrst level, producers decide on the destination of their goods between domestic and
foreign markets; and, at second level, they decide the use given to goods destined to
the domestic market.
Hence, the problem for the ﬁrst nesting level is:
max PAiAi = POiOi + PFXFC EXPi
s. t. Ai = ζi
(
diO
i+1
i
i + (1− di)EXP
i+1
i
i
) i
i+1
where POi and PFX are the prices of the goods sold in the domestic market, and the
goods’ world price, respectively; Oi and EXPi are the amounts sold in the domestic
market and abroad, respectively; ζi is a scale parameter; di is a share parameter; and
-i is the elasticity of transformation. After solving the optimization problem we get
the cost function, so that the zero-proﬁt condition would be:
(10)Π
CET
i = PAi −
1
ζi
(
d−ii PO
i+1
i + (1− di)−i(PFXFC)i+1
) 1
i+1
= 0
5See Powell and Gruen (1968) for an analytic description of CET functions. Notice that CET
functions involve a certain degree of substitution among goods assigned to diﬀerent markets or uses.
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where ΠCETi are unit proﬁts; and, from here, market-clearing conditions are:
Oi = Ai
(
−∂Π
CET
i
∂POi
)
(11)
EXPi = Ai
(
−∂Π
CET
i
∂FC
)
(12)
The second nesting level involves the distribution of Oi. We assume that its com-
ponents are perfect substitutes, so there is an inﬁnite elasticity of substitution. In this
case the optimization problem is:
max POiOi = POiIi +
n∑
j=1
POiIIij + POiCFi
s. t. Oi = Ii +
n∑
j=1
IIij + CFi
where Ii are goods destined to gross capital formation; IIij are goods produced in
sector i destined to intermediate use in sector j; and CFi are goods destined to ﬁnal
consumption. Now, we don’t need to write a speciﬁc zero-proﬁt condition since proﬁts
are zero by assumption. The equilibrium in this case would be:
Oi = Ii +
n∑
j=1
IIij + CFi (13)
To end this section, and following Ballard et al. (1985, pp. 76-77), the goods
destined to ﬁnal consumption are transformed into consumption of residents and con-
sumption of non-residents by means of a ﬁxed coeﬃcients matrix:


o11 o12 . . . o1n
o21 o22 . . . o2n
...
...
. . .
...
om1 om2 . . . omn

 ×


CF1
CF2
...
CFn

 =


∑r
h=1Q
h
1 +CFNR1∑r
h=1Q
h
2 +CFNR2
...∑r
h=1 Q
h
m

 (14)
where Qh1 , Q
h
2 , . . . , Q
h
m−2, Q
h
m is the consumption of household h; CFNR1, CFNR2,
. . ., CFNRm−2 is the consumption of non-residents; and oik are ﬁxed coeﬃcients
2.2 Consumption
Private consumers are divided into twelve households, according to the main house-
holder’s socioeconomic characteristics. Each household h maximizes a Cobb-Douglas
utility function Vh subject to a budget constraint. and is endowed with ﬁxed amounts
of capital Kh, skilled labour Lsh, and unskilled labour L
us
h . The ﬁxed amounts of skilled
and unskilled labour should be interpreted as a maximum supply of labour although
we also consider the existence of leisure and unemployment.
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Decisions on savings, leisure and ﬁnal consumption follow from the consumer’s
problem for each household h:
max Vh = (Q
h
sav)
τhsav(Qh)1−τ
h
sav
s. t. Yh =
m−1∑
k=1
PkQ
h
k + PsavQ
h
sav +W
sQhls +W
usQhlus
where Qhsav are savings, and Q
h is an aggregate of leisure Qhl and ﬁnal consumption of
goods Qhk (k = 1, . . . , m− 1):
Qh =

eh(Qhl )
σ
LQ
h
−1
σ
LQ
h + (1− eh)
(
m−1∏
k=1
(Qhk)
τhk
) σLQ
h
−1
σ
LQ
h


σ
LQ
h
σ
LQ
h
−1
with
Qhl =

fh(Qhls)
σLEI
h
−1
σLEI
h + (1− fh)(Qhlus)
σLEI
h
−1
σLEI
h

 σ
LEI
h
σLEI
h
−1
so that Yh is disposable income; Pk and Psav are prices of good k and savings,
respectively; W s and W us are wages for skilled and unskilled labour, used to value
leisure; Qhk is ﬁnal consumption of good k; Q
h
ls and Q
h
lus are leisure for skilled and
unskilled labour; τhsav, eh, fh, and τ
h
k are share parameters; σ
LQ
h are elasticities of
substitution between leisure and ﬁnal consumption; and σLEIh are the elasticities of
substitution between leisure for the skilled and leisure for the unskilled.
Household h’s disposable income is given by:
Yh = W
s(Lsh −Qhls)(1− Us) +W us(Lush −Qhlus)(1− Uus) +
+RKh +NTPSh +NTROWhFC − INCh (15)
where the ﬁrst and second terms correspond to labour rents (adjusted by leisure and
unemployment rates Us and Uus, for skilled and unskilled labour, respectively); the
third term is the rent of capital; NTPSh and NTROWhFC are net transfers received
from the public sector and the rest of the world, respectively; and INCh are income
taxes.
¿From the above optimization problem we can get the demand functions, so that
market equilibrium would be given by:
Qhk =
τhk Yh
Pk
(16)
Qhsav =
τhsavYh
Psav
(17)
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Qhls = fh
(
Yh
W s
)σLEI
(18)
Qhlus = (1− fh)
(
Yh
W us
)σLEI
(19)
2.3 Public sector
The starting point when modelling the public sector is the Musgravian notion of
diﬀerential incidence, which refers to the eﬀects of substitution among taxes, holding
constant public revenues and expenditure. In a broader sense, we could say that this
notion would involve keeping unchanged the size of the public sector after a ﬁscal
policy change. Following Shoven and Whalley (1977), a debate among applied general
equilibrium modellers has developed on the meaning of keeping unchanged the size of
the public sector, that is, the equal yield assumption6. In order to avoid ambiguous
welfare results, we assume that a constant size of the public sector involves keeping
unchanged the level of public consumption following the ﬁscal policy change.
A ﬁxed welfare level from ﬁnal public consumption does not mean that its de-
terminants are going to remain constant after the simulation exercise. For example,
due to the general equilibrium structure, endogenous variables are expected to change,
although the welfare level from ﬁnal public consumption will recover its initial level.
Assume that public expenditure is one of the endogenous variables that are modiﬁed.
Since we take as a restriction the level of public deﬁcit, then an increase (or decrease)
in public expenditure must be oﬀset by an equivalent increase (or decrease) in public
revenues (i. e., changing other tax rates). In the end, the solution will involve an
exogenous and constant public deﬁcit (or surplus), and keeping unchanged the level of
welfare from public consumption; public expenditure and revenues will undergone an
equivalent change.
Public sector income Y G is given by:
(20)
Y G = RKG +
n∑
i=1
(SOCCEi + SOCCWi) +
n∑
i=1
V ATi +
n∑
i=1
ITi
+
n∑
i=1
NPTi +
r∑
h=1
INCh −
r∑
h=1
NTPSh +NTROWGFC
where RKG is the public sector’s capital rent; SOCCEi and SOCCWi are the social
contributions paid by employers and employees, respectively; V ATi are the revenues
from the value-added tax; ITi are the revenues from import tariﬀs; NPTi are the rev-
enues from taxes on production; INCh are the (exogenous) revenues from the income
tax; NTPSh and NTROWGFC are (exogenous) net transfers paid to households, and
received from the rest of the world, respectively; and the following taxes are modelled
as eﬀective ad valorem rates, estimated from benchmark data (see section 3.1):
6See Pereira (1995) for an overview of the diﬀerent concepts of equal yield.
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SOCCEi = socceiW
s Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W s
)
+ socceiW
us Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W us
)
SOCCWi = soccwiW
s Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W s
)
+ soccwiW
us Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W us
)
V ATi = PFXFC Ai
(
− ∂Π
A
i
∂FC
)
(1 + iti)vatimpi+
+ PDISTiAi
(
− ∂Π
A
i
∂PDISTi
)
(1 + npti)vatdisti
ITi = PFXFC Ai
(
− ∂Π
A
i
∂FC
)
iti
NPTi = PDISTiAi
(
− ∂Π
A
i
∂PDISTi
)
npti
The macro closure for the public sector includes an identity and an equation. Both
public investment INV PUB and public surplus (or deﬁcit) BALPUB are taken as
exogenous, so public savings SAV PUB are also exogenous:
BALPUB = SAV PUB − INV PUB (21)
Recall that we are imposing into the model a restriction of constant public surplus (or
deﬁcit). Lastly, ﬁnal public consumption CPUB would be given by:
CPUB = PmQm = Y
G − SAV PUB (22)
where good m is public ﬁnal consumption.
2.4 Investment and savings
Investment should aﬀect the economy’s productive capacity in subsequent periods
of time but, in our static framework investment exerts its inﬂuence on the economy as
a component of ﬁnal demand.
Following Dervis et al. (1981), total investment INV TOTAL is splitted into sec-
toral gross capital formation Ii through a ﬁxed coeﬃcients Leontief structure. The
minimization cost problem would be:
min PINV INV TOTAL =
n∑
i=1
POiIi
s. t. INV TOTAL = min
(
I1
l1
, . . . ,
In
ln
)
11
where PINV is the price of investment, and li are ﬁxed coeﬃcients; and the equation
for the derived unit proﬁt ΠI would be:
ΠI = PINV −
n∑
i=1
liPOi = 0 (23)
The second equation for the macro closure of the model relates to the identity
between savings and investment. Investment has been described above, and national
savings are the aggregation of private and public savings, with NLB denoting the net
lending/borrowing of the economy:
Psav
r∑
h =1
Qhsav + SAV PUB − PINV INV TOTAL = NLBFC (24)
2.5 Foreign sector
When modelling the rest of the world, we assume that the economy analyzed is
small. This implies that the country faces exogenous world prices, and hence perfectly
elastic functions for both exports demand and imports supply.
We need to include in the model an equation for the balance of payments, which
is the third equation for macro closure, and shows that the diﬀerence between receipts
and payments with the rest of the world is the net lending/borrowing of the economy:
n∑
i =1
PFXEXPi +
s∑
h =1
NTROWh +NTROWG +
+
∑m−2
k =1 PkCFNRk
FC
−
n∑
i =1
PFXIMPi −
r∑
h =1
PFXQhm−1 =
= NLB (25)
where, together with trade ﬂows, EXPi and IMPi, the equation includes the net
transfers received by households, NTROWh, and the public sector, NTROWG; the
ﬁnal consumption of non residents within the economy’s borders, CFNRk; and the
consumption of domestic households abroad, Qhm−1.
Our foreign sector closure follows de Melo and Tarr (1992). An equation like (25)
avoids, for example, the possibility of a high increase in exports with no change in
imports, which would be unreliable on leading to a continuous capital outﬂow. This
problem can be avoided by taking as exogenous the net lending/borrowing.
2.6 Factor markets
Capital, skilled labour, and unskilled labour are the primary factors in the model,
and their derived demands can be obtained by applying Shepard’s lemma to equations
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(2) and (3). Now we will present the factor supplies and market clearing conditions
for each market.
Households and the public sector have a ﬁxed endowment of capital Kh and KG,
respectively, so that the supply of capital is inelastic. The capital rent adjusts to clear
the market. Capital is internationally immobile, and perfectly mobile across domestic
sectors. The equilibrium condition in the capital market is:
r∑
h =1
Kh +KG =
n∑
i =1
V Ai
(
−∂Π
LK
i
∂R
)
(26)
Each household h is endowed with a ﬁxed amount of skilled and unskilled labour,
but, due to the existence of leisure, supply functions can be elastic. Labour supply
also depends on unemployment, since we assume a case of equilibrium unemployment,
according to a matching unemployment speciﬁcation. This approach has the advantage
of allowing the researcher to model frictions in otherwise conventional models, with a
minimum of additional complexity; see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a recent
survey of the matching function in macroeconomics.
According to this framework, ﬁrms and workers have to spend some resources
before job creation and production can take place. We will assume that there is a
matching function that gives the number of jobs created, following the approach of
Balistreri (2002), based on Markusen (1990). In this way, we deﬁne wages W s0 and
W us0 as reservation wages W
s and W us including a premium that represents search
costs, denoted by 1
Hs
and 1
Hus
, respectively:
W s0 = W
s 1
Hs
(27)
W us0 = W
us 1
Hus
(28)
being
Hs = (1− Us)


∑n
i=1 Li
(
− ∂ΠLi
∂W s
)
∑n
i=1 Li
(
− ∂ΠLi
∂W s
)


η0 (
Us
Us
)η1
(29)
Hus = (1− Uus)


∑n
i=1 Li
(
− ∂ΠLi
∂Wus
)
∑n
i=1 Li
(
− ∂ΠLi
∂Wus
)


η0 (
Uus
Uus
)η1
(30)
where Us and Uus are the unemployment rates in the base year (in our case, 10 per cent
for skilled labour, and 20 per cent for unskilled labour); Li is the benchmark aggregate
employment; and η0 and η1 represent externalities from labour supply and unemploy-
ment, respectively. Like capital, labour is internationally immobile, but mobile across
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sectors. Equilibrium in the skilled labour market is determined by the above equations
and:
r∑
h =1
(Lsh −Qhls)(1− Us) =
n∑
i =1
Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W s
)
(31)
r∑
h =1
(Lush −Qhlus)(1− Uus) =
n∑
i =1
Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W us
)
(32)
2.7 Increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition
There are many well-known ways of modelling competition among ﬁrms according
to several alternative assumptions. However, a trade-oﬀ between theoretical complex-
ity and empirical data availability is always present, since the lack of data usually
prevents implementing many imperfect competition speciﬁcations, or even leads to use
inadequate data (aggregated ﬁgures, old data, data belonging to another country, . . . ),
which has been a common critique to deterministic CGE models. For these reasons,
we have chosen to represent competition among ﬁrms in our model in the following
way.
The constant returns to scale version of the model would be characterized by a
competitive price rule (see section 2.1). An alternative version embodying a non-
competitive price rule and increasing returns to scale, due to the existence of some
ﬁxed labour and capital requirements, is developed in this section. The presence of
ﬁxed costs means that average costs are higher than marginal costs, so that ﬁrms set
prices by charging a markup on marginal costs. This price rule is based on the idea
that ﬁrms face demand functions with a negative slope and compete a` la Cournot.
There is free entry and exit of ﬁrms in each sector, so that in equilibrium ﬁrms just
break even.
This version of the model involves both replacing and including several equations.
First, the unit proﬁt function ΠXi in equation (1) must be replaced by the following
one, which includes ﬁxed costs:
(33)Π
X
i = PXi −
(
RKFi +W
sLF si +W
usLF usi
)
Ei
Xi
− c0iPV Ai −
n∑
j=1
cjiPOj
= 0
where LF si , LF
us
i , and KFi are, respectively, the ﬁxed requirements of skilled labour,
unskilled labour, and capital for each ﬁrm; and Ei is the number of ﬁrms operating in
sector i.
Given these ﬁxed factor requirements, the equilibrium conditions in factor markets
shown in section 2.6 must be replaced by:
r∑
h =1
Kh +KG =
n∑
i =1
EiKFi +
n∑
i =1
V Ai
(
−∂Π
LK
i
∂R
)
(34)
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r∑
h =1
(Lsh −Qhls)(1− Us) =
n∑
i =1
EiLF si +
n∑
i =1
Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W s
)
(35)
r∑
h =1
(Lush −Qhlus)(1− Uus) =
n∑
i =1
EiLF
us
i +
n∑
i =1
Li
(
− ∂Π
L
i
∂W us
)
(36)
Finally, from the ﬁrst-order condition of proﬁt maximization we can derive the
non-competitive price rule:
MARKUPi =
Ωi
Eiκdi
(37)
where MARKUP is the price-cost margin or Lerner index; Ωi = 1 are Cournot con-
jectural variations for each sector i; κdi is the perceived elasticity of demand for each
ﬁrm; and the inverse of the number of ﬁrms in each sector 1/Ei can be approximated
by the Herﬁndahl concentration index, since ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric. As
can be seen in equation (37), when the concentration index is very low, the sectoral
price rule approaches the competitive one.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Calibration and data
The model has been calibrated using the social accounting matrix MCS-90 (see
Uriel et al. (1997) and Go´mez (2001)), which represents the benchmark equilibrium of
the model.
When calibrating the scale and share parameters we make use of Rutherford’s
(1999) method, implemented with GAMS/MPSGE. The method starts with the bal-
anced equilibrium for the social accounting matrix as the reference equilibrium, with
a set of elasticities taken from the available empirical evidence.
Calibration is made in three steps. In the ﬁrst step, the matrix collects the quanti-
ties appearing in the equations, which means a ﬁrst reference point in the isoquant of
the calibrated function. In the second step, relative prices in that year ﬁx the slope of
the isoquant in that point. Since matrix data do not distinguish between prices and
quantities, only showing values, we follow Harberger’s (1972) assumption and choose
the quantity units for goods and factors so that we can have unit prices in the chosen
numerary. The last step in calibration uses elasticities, which show the curvature of the
isoquant. To sum up, we have the slope and curvature for any point in each isoquant,
and from here all the unknown parameters are calibrated using Rutherford’s method.
In addition to the data from the MCS-90, taxes have been further disaggregated
using Spanish National Accounts. The data on imperfect competition are taken from
Bajo and Salas (1998), who compute concentration indices using data on sales for more
than two million ﬁrms, obtained from oﬃcial VAT returns.
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In turn, regarding elasticities, the elasticities of substitution between labour and
capital σLKi , as well as Armington elasticities σ
A
i for the CES functions, are taken
from GTAP (Hertel, 1997). As for the elasticities of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labour σLLi , the available evidence shows quite diﬀerent ﬁgures, which may
range from more than 5 to (small) negative values; see Hamermesh (1993), Chapter
3. Since our results could be presumed to be highly dependent on the value of this
elasticity, the simulations have been performed using two alternative values, constant
across sectors: a “low” value of 1, which would agree with the recent estimates of
Biscourp and Gianella (2001) for French manufacturing; and a “high” value of 4, more
in line witth older studies (e.g., Dougherty, 1972).
On the other hand, the elasticities of substitution between leisure and consumption
σLQh have been obtained using the procedure of Ballard et al. (1985), from the uncom-
pensated elasticity of labour supply estimated in Garc´ia and Molina (1998)7; a total of
40 hours worked per week, out of a potential 70, has been assumed. We have no data
available on the elasticities of substitution between leisure for the skilled and leisure
for the unskilled σLEIh , so we assume they take a constant value across households of
0.5; such a value has been carefully checked in the sensitivity analysis (see section
3.4). Finally, the remaining elasticities of substitution are either zero (for Leontief
functions) or one (for Cobb-Douglas functions), whereas elasticities of transformation
-i come from de Melo and Tarr (1992).
The deﬁnitions of households and sectors are presented in Table 2, and the Herﬁnd-
ahl concentration indices and the diﬀerent elasticities are shown in Table 3.
3.2 Scenarios and simulation
The simulation performed consists of a decrease in social contribution rates com-
pensated with an increase of 6.25 per cent in value-added tax rates (which amounts
to an increase of one percentage point), where the decrease in social contributions is
endogenously computed by the model, subject to the restrictions on public sector be-
haviour examined in section 2.3. Other alternative simulations (not shown here, but
available from the authors upon request) have been also performed, but the results are
roughly similar.
It is worth to stress that our general equilibrium framework allows us to study the
restrictive role of the value-added tax in this policy analysis, which is often neglected
in partial equilibrium models. As we will see, the feedback eﬀect of an increase in the
value-added tax will be quite relevant for the results.
The model developed in section 2 is available in two versions: a ﬁrst one where
ﬁrms set prices in a competitive way and technology exhibits constant returns to scale,
7These authors estimate the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the own wage, for both
men and women, from diﬀerent functional forms. Since they ﬁnd no evidence against the null that
these elasticities are zero, we use this value as starting point when computing σLQh .
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and a second one with a non-competitive price rule under a technology of increasing
returns to scale. Due to space reasons, only the results from the latter will be those
shown below. The simulations from the alternative version led to slightly weaker eﬀects
on the main variables, and are available from the authors upon request.
On the other hand, the simulation results are presented under four scenarios, de-
pending on whether the decrease in social contributions is made either for both types
of labour, or only for unskilled labour; and on the value taken by the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labour σLLi :
1. Scenario BOTH-1. Social contributions decrease for both skilled and unskilled
labour, and the elasticity of substitution between them is 1.
2. Scenario BOTH-4. Social contributions decrease for both skilled and unskilled
labour, and the elasticity of substitution between them is 4.
3. Scenario UNSK-1. Social contributions decrease only for unskilled labour, and
the elasticity of substitution between them is 1.
4. Scenario UNSK-4. Social contributions decrease only for unskilled labour, and
the elasticity of substitution between them is 4.
The equilibrium of the competitive version of the model involves the resolution of
three sets of equations:
• Zero-proﬁt conditions (equations 1 to 3, 7, 10, and 23).
• Market clearing in goods markets (equations 4 and 5, 8, 9, 11 to 13, and 16 to
19) and in factor markets (equations 26, 31, and 32).
• Restrictions on disposable income (equations 15 and 20), equilibrium unemploy-
ment (equations 27 to 30), transformation of goods (equations 6 and 14), and
macro closure (equations 21, 22, 24, and 25).
In turn, in the equilibrium of the non-competitive version equation (33) replaces
(1), and equations (34), (35) and (36) replace (26), (31) and (32), respectively. Finally,
equation (37) should be also added.
3.3 Results
The results from the above simulations appear in tables 4 through 8, for our four
scenarios. Table 4 shows the eﬀects on several aggregate variables: employment, prices
(measured by the consumption price index), real wage, premium on the reservation
wage, real capital rent, and unemployment rate. In turn, tables 5 to 8 show the
eﬀects on some selected variables (labour costs, employment, leisure, and welfare,
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respectively), disaggregated according to the sectors or households included in our
model.
Beginning with the eﬀects on aggregate variables in Table 4, and summarising the
main conclusions, we can see that, ﬁrst, discriminating when cutting labour taxes in
favour of unskilled labour would have a clear positive eﬀect on the employment of
that segment of workers. Second, a higher elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labour leads to stronger eﬀects on most variables, but only when social
contributions are cut just for the latter. Third, increases in value-added tax rates,
in order to keep unchanged public sector deﬁcit, do matter in a general equilibrium
framework. And lastly, the quantitatively small eﬀect on all variables of this ﬁscal
reform would be evident.
Employment slightly increases for skilled and unskilled workers when social con-
tributions fall for both types of labour; however, when contributions are decreased
only for unskilled workers, total job creation would be higher, although employment
for skilled workers would decrease. Overall, total employment increases in all cases,
reaching the highest eﬀects when tax cuts are addressed just on unskilled labour, and
for the “high” value of σLLi (i.e., in the scenario UNSK-4). To give a rough quantitative
ﬂavour of these results, we have applied the ﬁgures in the ﬁrst three rows of Table 4 for
the UNSK scenarios, to Spanish employment data for the last available year, 2000. We
found that total employment would increase by 19,912 people (27,556 unskilled minus
7,644 skilled), and by 24,113 people (34,975 unskilled minus 10,862 skilled), following
the implementation of a cut in social contributions in scenarios UNSK-1 and UNSK-4,
respectively.
As expected, since value-added tax rates are increased, prices go up around 0.20
per cent in all the scenarios. Although capital rents fall in all cases, the change in
real wages depend on the scenario. When social contributions are decreased for all
types of labour, the higher labour demand leads to an increase in real wages for both
skilled and unskilled workers. However, when labour taxes decrease only for unskilled
workers, there is an asymmetric eﬀect, with real wages falling for skilled labour and
rising for unskilled labour. Also as expected, the opposite happens for the premium on
reservation wages: since this premium covers the costs associated with ﬁnding a job,
when the probability of becoming unemployed falls the premium should also fall.
Regarding the unemployment rate, it always falls except for skilled labour in the
UNSK scenarios. This means that the simulated policy would work for unskilled work-
ers, despite the increase in their real wages and the reduction in their leisure (see Table
7 below), so that the job creation eﬀect prevails. The fall in the total rate of unemploy-
ment, however, turns to be very small, and is again higher when social contributions
are reduced just for unskilled labour, and for the “high” value of σLLi . If we apply now
the ﬁgures in the last three rows of Table 4 for the UNSK scenarios, to the Spanish data
on unemployment rates in 2000, the total unemployment rate would decrease by just
0.04 percentage points (corresponding to a decrease of 0.08 for the unskilled and an
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increase of 0.09 for the skilled), and also by 0.04 percentage points (corresponding to
a decrease of 0.10 for the unskilled and an increase of 0.13 for the skilled), in scenarios
UNSK-1 and UNSK-4, respectively. Notice that the eﬀects on unemployment rates are
even lower than those on employment, which would be explained by the decrease in
leisure (see Table 7 below), especially for unskilled labour due to the increase in real
wages for this type of labour.
Table 5 shows the eﬀects on sectoral labour costs. In general, labour costs decrease
in all sectors, with a more homogenous pattern regarding both types of labour in the
BOTH scenarios; on the contrary, in the UNSK scenarios the fall in labour costs is
signiﬁcantly higher for unskilled labour, as expected. Diﬀerences in the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labour only matter in the UNSK scenarios,
with the “high” value of σLLi leading to stronger eﬀects in the case of skilled labour.
Regarding particular sectors, those more aﬀected by the ﬁscal policy change are the
services activities (with the exception of Other services), and the less aﬀected, Agri-
culture, and Other services. In the case of Agriculture, this can be related to the lower
social contributions rates in this sector as compared to others, due to its special ﬁscal
regime; whereas Other services includes the public sector, which has been constrained
in the model due to the equal yield assumption.
Turning now to the eﬀects on sectoral employment, we see in Table 6 some asym-
metries among sectors, despite a similar decrease in labour costs for most of them.
This can be explained since capital is in fact the only ﬁxed factor, because leisure and
matching unemployment allow for some ﬂexibility in the case of labour. So, if capital
ﬂows into any sector, it should ﬂow out from other sectors, and a general equilibrium
framework allows to represent this fact. As can be seen in Table 6, this eﬀect is rela-
tively small in all sectors, except for the negative eﬀect on Energy and water (a sector
that is not intensive in unskilled labour, and with a very low ratio of social security
contributions to value added), and the positive eﬀect on Metal and machinery (the
most unskilled labour-intensive sector, and with a high ratio of social security contri-
butions to value added). In both cases capital drives the eﬀect on employment, unlike
the rest of sectors (in particular, services activities), where the decrease in labour costs
would be the main force behind changes in employment.
At the sectoral level, when social contributions are decreased for both types of
labour, most of the increase in employment (both skilled and unskilled) occurs in
Metal and machinery, House renting, and, at a lower extent, Finance and insurance.
However, when the ﬁscal policy change is addressed only to unskilled labour, there is
a generalized fall in employment for skilled workers, with the exception of Agriculture
(for the “high” value of σLLi ), and Metal and machinery. On the other hand, unskilled
employment rises in all sectors, except for Agriculture, and Energy and water (in this
case, only for the “low” value of σLLi ); with the highest increases occurring in Metal
and machinery, House renting, and Finance and insurance. The eﬀects on both skilled
and unskilled employment are normally stronger for the “high” value of σLLi , but only
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in the UNSK scenarios.
As noticed above, leisure and matching unemployment allow for a certain ﬂexibil-
ity on the side of labour supply. Leisure eﬀects (see Table 7) show in general small
variations, but in most of cases we can conﬁrm that decreasing social contributions
would involve a decrease in leisure, especially for unskilled labour. Households would
prefer to work or to try to ﬁnd a job, following a cut in social contribution rates.
Finally, the welfare results (measured as Hicksian equivalent variations) presented
in Table 8, show some asymmetries among households, due to the diﬀerence in their
income sources (see Table 9). In any case, if we compare the BOTH and UNSK
scenarios (“low” or “high” values of σLLi do not lead to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results),
the most beneﬁted are households 1 and 7, whereas household 6 is the most damaged.
As can be seen in Table 9, households 1 and 7 (i. e., Rural, employed; and Urban,
employed, non graduate, respectively) would have a majority of unskilled workers,
unlike household 6 (i. e., Urban, employed, graduate), with a majority of skilled
workers. On the other hand, the main income source for the rest of households would
be capital, so that, as capital rental rates decrease, the welfare levels of those households
would also be reduced.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis on several key variables and parameters of the model has
been carried out. The main results (available from the authors upon request) are as
follows:
• The simulations performed above assumed that capital endowments were ﬁxed.
When the simulations were redone assuming an exogenous increase in capital
endowments, we found that the sectoral pattern of the variation in labour em-
ployment was roughly unchanged.
• Regarding the elasticities of substitution, the results were rather insensitive to the
values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. On the other
hand, in the case of the elasticity of substitution between leisure for the skilled
and leisure for the unskilled, the eﬀects were quantitatively higher the higher the
value of that elasticity. The same result applied to the elasticity of substitution
between savings and consumption, even though the degree of sensitivity was quite
low in this case.
• Finally, the signs of the eﬀects were robust to the values of the parameters mea-
suring externalities (from labour supply and unemployment) in the matching
function.
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4 Concluding remarks
The still high unemployment rates in most European countries, heavily concen-
trated among low-skilled workers, has led several authors to advocate in favour of
selective tax cuts on social security contributions for low wage earners. This measure
is justiﬁed on the grounds that the (currently assumed) high level of social contribu-
tions could be a disincentive for labour demand regarding low-skilled workers.
In this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of such a proposal for the case of
Spain, a medium-size economy whose labour market is characterized by a substantial
unemployment rate, higher than the European average, and with a very high compo-
nent of unskilled unemployment. We simulate the eﬀects of a cut in social contribution
rates (i) for all types of labour, and (ii) only for unskilled labour, within a CGE model,
calibrated for the Spanish economy. The model allows ﬁrms to follow a non-competitive
price rule under increasing returns to scale, and incorporates an equal yield assump-
tion, so that public consumption is kept unchanged following the ﬁscal policy change.
This involves that the reduction in social security contributions is compensated with
an increase in value-added tax rates amounting to one percentage point. In addition,
the labour market is assumed to follow a matching unemployment rule, which allows
to model in a simple way any frictions present in that market. Finally, the simulations
are performed under two alternative values of the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labour.
The results of the simulations show a small positive eﬀect on the employment of
unskilled workers following a selective reduction in social contributions only for this
type of labour, accompanied by a negative eﬀect on the employment of skilled workers,
which leads to an almost negligible positive eﬀect on total employment. The overall
eﬀect on employment, however, is higher than in the case of a general reduction in social
contributions for all types of labour. Although the total unemployment rate falls, this
eﬀect would be even lower than in the case of employment, due to the decrease in
leisure, especially for unskilled labour, following the increase in real wages for this
type of labour. On the other hand, the higher the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labour, the stronger the eﬀects on unskilled employment and
unemployment, but only when social contributions are reduced just for the unskilled.
Finally, the eﬀects would be asymmetric among households and sectors, being stronger
for those households and sectors where the share of unskilled labour is higher.
To conclude, notice the importance for our results of the equal yield assumption in
a general equilibrium setting, leading to the crucial feedback eﬀect of the increase in
indirect tax rates (aimed to compensate the fall in social security contributions), which
is neglected in partial equilibrium analyses. In this way, even though a policy measure
such as that evaluated in this paper would provide some room to reduce unskilled
unemployment, the initial positive eﬀect would be later oﬀset to a great extent, so
that the total result would turn to be rather modest.
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Table 1: Unemployment rates according to educational levels in 1998 (% on active
population)
Unemployment Less than Secondary Higher than
Country rate, total (a) secondary (b) (b) secondary (b)
Australia 7.9 9.0 5.8 3.3
Austria 5.5 6.7 3.4 2.5
Belgium 9.4 13.1 7.4 3.2
Canada 8.4 12.2 7.8 5.2
Denmark 5.1 7.0 4.6 3.3
Finland 11.6 15.6 11.9 6.5
France 11.9 14.9 9.5 6.6
Germany 9.3 16.6 10.8 5.6
Greece 11.0 6.5 9.6 7.3
Ireland 7.9 11.6 4.5 3.0
Italy 12.3 10.8 8.7 7.0
Netherlands 4.4 6.2 3.2 2.3
New Zealand 7.6 10.4 4.6 4.3
Norway 3.2 4.0 3.1 1.7
Portugal 5.2 4.3 4.3 2.6
Spain 18.8 17.0 15.3 13.1
Sweden 8.4 10.4 7.2 3.6
Switzerland 3.7 5.6 2.8 2.8
Turkey 6.6 4.0 6.2 4.3
United Kingdom 6.2 10.5 5.0 2.6
United States 4.5 8.5 4.4 2.1
European Union 10.0 10.6 9.1 6.0
OECD 6.9 8.3 6.1 3.5
a. 15-64 years of age.
b. 25-64 years of age.
Source: OECD (2000, pp. 216, and 228-230).
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Table 2: Classiﬁcation of households and sectors
Households
1 - Rural, employed
2 - Rural, self-employed, non agricultural
3 - Rural, self-employed, agricultural
4 - Rural, other incomes, males
5 - Rural, other incomes, females
6 - Urban, employed, graduate
7 - Urban, employed, non graduate
8 - Urban, self-employed
9 - Urban, other incomes, males, under 65
10 - Urban, other incomes, females, under 65
11 - Urban, other incomes, males, over 65
12 - Urban, other incomes, females, over 65
Sectors
1 - Agriculture
2 - Energy and water
3 - Nonenergy minerals, chemicals
4 - Metal and machinery
5 - Other manufacturing
6 - Construction
7 - Commerce and hotel trade
8 - Transport and communications
9 - Finance and insurance
10 - House renting
11 - Other services
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Table 3: Concentration indices and elasticities
Herﬁndahl Elasticity of Armington Elasticity of
index substitution elasticity transformation
labour-capital
Sectors 1/Ei σ
LK
i σ
A
i -i
(a) (b) (c) (d)
1 0.00154 0.56 4.4 3.9
2 0.13939 1.26 5.2 2.9
3 0.03533 1.26 3.8 2.9
4 0.04666 1.26 10.4 2.9
5 0.01404 1.26 5.6 2.9
6 0.00572 1.40 3.8 0.7
7 0.01790 1.26 3.8 0.7
8 0.24310 1.68 3.8 0.7
9 0.03855 1.26 3.8 0.7
10 0.00799 1.26 3.8 0.7
11 0.00111 1.26 3.8 0.7
Elasticity of
substitution
leisure-consumption
Households σLQh
(e)
1 0.428
2 0.057
3 0.037
4 0.060
5 0.038
6 0.304
7 0.402
8 0.048
9 0.087
10 0.059
11 0.062
12 0.019
Source: Elaborated from:
(a) Bajo and Salas (1998)
(b) and (c) Hertel (1997)
(d) de Melo and Tarr (1992)
(e) Ballard et al. (1985) and Garc´ia and Molina (1998).
27
Table 4: Simulation results: Eﬀects on aggregate variables (% change from base year)
Variable BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
Employment Skilled 0.05 0.05 -0.19 -0.27
Unskilled 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.33
Total 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.21
Prices 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21
Real wage Skilled 0.41 0.43 -0.10 -0.29
Unskilled 0.44 0.42 0.80 0.95
Wage premium Skilled -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.12
Unskilled -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.17
Real capital rent -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 -0.38
Unemployment rate Skilled -0.21 -0.20 0.74 1.09
Unskilled -0.11 -0.12 -0.54 -0.69
Total -0.11 -0.13 -0.30 -0.36
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Table 5: Simulation results: Eﬀects on sectoral labour costs (% change from base year)
Skilled labour
Sectors BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.34
2 -0.67 -0.68 -0.15 -0.42
3 -0.49 -0.50 -0.14 -0.40
4 -0.49 -0.50 -0.14 -0.40
5 -0.48 -0.49 -0.14 -0.40
6 -0.49 -0.51 -0.14 -0.40
7 -0.59 -0.60 -0.15 -0.41
8 -0.76 -0.77 -0.15 -0.44
9 -0.88 -0.89 -0.16 -0.45
10 -0.84 -0.85 -0.16 -0.45
11 -0.37 -0.38 -0.14 -0.39
Unskilled labour
Sectors BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.17
2 -0.70 -0.69 -1.11 -0.94
3 -0.52 -0.51 -0.80 -0.63
4 -0.52 -0.51 -0.80 -0.63
5 -0.51 -0.50 -0.78 -0.61
6 -0.53 -0.52 -0.81 -0.64
7 -0.62 -0.62 -0.98 -0.80
8 -0.79 -0.78 -1.27 -1.09
9 -0.91 -0.90 -1.47 -1.29
10 -0.88 -0.87 -1.41 -1.23
11 -0.40 -0.39 -0.59 -0.42
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Table 6: Simulation results: Eﬀects on sectoral employment (% change from base year)
Skilled labour
Sectors BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 -0.19 -0.20 -0.05 1.39
2 -0.33 -0.34 -0.68 -1.10
3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.26 -0.37
4 0.49 0.49 0.23 0.15
5 -0.02 -0.03 -0.27 -0.42
6 -0.01 -0.02 -0.31 -0.49
7 0.0 -0.01 -0.31 -0.70
8 0.08 0.08 -0.31 -0.84
9 0.15 0.15 -0.22 -0.50
10 0.31 0.31 -0.17 -0.54
11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.04
Unskilled labour
Sectors BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.35
2 -0.31 -0.31 -0.03 0.30
3 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.29
4 0.52 0.52 0.71 0.81
5 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.19
6 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.19
7 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.39
8 0.10 0.11 0.43 0.89
9 0.18 0.19 0.63 1.68
10 0.33 0.34 0.65 1.51
11 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.06
Capital
Sectors BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
2 -0.41 -0.41 -0.42 -0.41
3 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
4 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.53
5 0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.02
6 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.02
7 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04
8 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12
9 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.01
10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
11 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.11
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Table 7: Simulation results: Eﬀects on leisure (% change from base year)
Skilled labour
Households BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 -0.05 -0.05 0.38 0.53
2 -0.35 -0.35 -0.08 0.02
3 -0.35 -0.35 0.07 0.22
4 -0.21 -0.21 0.24 0.40
5 -0.22 -0.22 0.21 0.35
6 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.17
7 -0.04 -0.03 0.37 0.52
8 -0.37 -0.37 -0.09 0.01
9 -0.23 -0.22 0.12 0.24
10 -0.20 -0.20 0.12 0.23
11 -0.19 -0.18 0.07 0.15
12 -0.20 -0.19 0.10 0.20
Unskilled labour
Households BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 -0.04 -0.05 -0.18 -0.23
2 -0.34 -0.35 -0.64 -0.74
3 -0.35 -0.35 -0.49 -0.54
4 -0.20 -0.21 -0.31 -0.36
5 -0.21 -0.22 -0.35 -0.41
6 -0.01 -0.02 -0.69 -0.93
7 -0.02 -0.03 -0.19 -0.24
8 -0.36 -0.37 -0.65 -0.75
9 -0.22 -0.22 -0.44 -0.52
10 -0.19 -0.20 -0.44 -0.53
11 -0.18 -0.18 -0.49 -0.61
12 -0.19 -0.19 -0.46 -0.56
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Table 8: Simulation results: Eﬀects on welfare (% change from base year)
Households BOTH-1 BOTH-4 UNSK-1 UNSK-4
1 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.21
2 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32
3 -0.33 -0.33 -0.31 -0.31
4 -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15
5 -0.21 -0.21 -0.18 -0.18
6 0.09 0.09 -0.18 -0.28
7 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.20
8 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.34
9 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.17
10 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
11 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
12 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.19
Table 9: Sources of the factor incomes (%)
Unskilled Skilled
Households labour labour Capital
1 45.87 17.70 36.43
2 3.93 3.95 92.12
3 4.27 1.38 94.35
4 20.50 5.01 74.49
5 11.79 3.74 84.48
6 1.49 55.05 43.46
7 42.68 19.56 37.75
8 3.11 2.90 93.99
9 14.06 8.61 77.32
10 14.45 10.81 74.74
11 16.25 19.48 64.27
12 7.01 6.20 86.79
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